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STATEMENT OF CASE

This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court dismissing an application for
post-conviction relief.

The underlying conviction was based upon a Rule 11 Plea

Agreement which ultimately is the basis for this appeal. The Agreement was agreed to
by the Prosecuting Attorney of Owyhee County and Mr. Green's attorney, The Owyhee
County Public Defender. Under a provision of the Agreement entitled "Other terms and
conditions of this plea agreement:" in someone's handwriting appear the words "Victims
Restitution- Waiver of Rule 35, Appeal and Post Conviction." Specifically this Appeal
deals with the legal effect of those Waivers as it relates to effective assistance of counsel.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner Green was charged with four counts of Lewd conduct with a minor
child and one count of rape. Green's attorney, the Owyhee County public defender urged
Green to accept a plea bargain he had worked out with the Prosecutor.

The plea

agreement was that Green would enter an Alford Plea to two counts of Lewd conduct and
one count of injury to a child amended from the original charge of rape. The entry of the
plea would be pursuant to Rule 11, ICR and would be binding on the judge who would
pronounce sentence. A promise was made to Green that the sentence would be a retained
jurisdiction commonly referred to as a rider and probation at the end of the rider. (See
Green's second affidavit, paragraph 6, Clerk's record, page 70) Green states that there
would be a guaranty of the rider and then probation. Green asserted that he did not
commit the rape and could not plead guilty to something he did not do. Green's attorney
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advised him that unless he plead to the amended charge of injury to a child, still a felony,
the prosecutor would not agree to the rider. Green states he was advised by counsel the
only way he was assured of probation was by agreeing to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement.
The Rule 11 Plea Agreement is set forth at page 19 of the Clerk's Record on
Appeal. The Plea Agreement provides that "The defendant will plead to Counts I, II and
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford in Count III, as listed in the THIRD AMENDED
INDICTMENT. The remaining counts will be dismissed upon acceptance by the Court
of this Rule 11 Plea Agreement." Green would undergo a psychosexual evaluation, terms
and length of sentencing would open for argument, the Court would retain jurisdiction for
a period of up to 180 days; and the state was free to argue imposition sentence at the
retained jurisdiction hearing. Then at some time after the typewritten document was
prepared under a heading of "other terms and conditions of this plea agreement" in
someone's handwriting appear the words "Victim Restitution- Waiver of Rule 35, Appeal,
and Post Conviction.

Below that appears the signature's of the prosecutor, public

defender and the defendant.
Green states in his first affidavit that he does not remember of being advised that
he waived his Rule 35, appeal or post-conviction rights by entering into the plea
agreement. He states specifically: "I have no recollection of the handwriting being on the
agreement at the time I signed the agreement or approved the agreement." (Clerk's
Record, p. 10) Nor did he remember there being any mention of the waiver of those
rights during the discussions with counsel regarding the agreement, just that it was
emphasized that he was going to do a rider and be placed on probation.
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Green was sentenced on December 20, 2011, to a term of fifteen years
determinate, fifteen years indeterminate to run concurrently on Counts 1 and 2 with the
court retaining jurisdiction for up to 365 days, and five plus five on the other count,
consecutive to Counts 1 and 2 with the court retaining jurisdiction. Green served the
period of retained jurisdiction, and received a probation recommendation from the review
committee.
When it was the time for the Court to conduct a review hearing on the period of
retained jurisdiction, another judge conducted the review and decided to drop jurisdiction
and impose sentence.

The public defender on Green's behalf filed a Rule 35 motion

which was denied based upon the waiver in the plea agreement and the appeal to the
Supreme Court which was denied on same grounds and a Remittitur was issued on
September 12, 2012.
The Petition for Post Conviction relief was filed on March 13, 2013.

An

Amended Petition for Post Conviction relief was filed on May 28, 2013. The District
Judge entered an Order of Dismissal of the Petition on June 21, 2013, and a Final
Judgment entered June 21, 2013. A Motion to Reconsider the dismissal was timely filed
but was also denied based upon the lack of timeliness in filing the Petition. The Court
determined the waiver contained as part of the plea agreement operated to require the
Court to dismiss the Petition. From the dismissal this appeal was taken.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

DOES THE CONDUCT OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN ADVISING
PETITIONER TO AGREE TO A PLEA AGREEMENT WHICH IN PART
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REQUIRES PETITIONER TO WAIVE HIS RIGHTS TO APPEAL, RULE
35 MOTION AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF CONSTITUTE
AN
INHERENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST DEPRIVING PETITIONER
OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?

II.
IS IT PERMISSABLE FOR THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TO
REQUIRE A WAIVER OF A DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS PURSUANT TO I.
C. SEC. 19-4901 WHEN ENTERING INTO A PLEA AGREEMENT?

III.
IS THE ONE YEAR LIMITATION FOR FILING A 19-4901 PETITION
TOLLED DURING A PERIOD OF RETAINED JURISDICTION.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Idaho Code Section 19-4901 establishes a remedy to "Any person who has been
convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime ... " One of the claims allowable under the statute
considered by the court in reviewing a petition for post conviction relief is whether that
person received in the course of the trial proceedings effective assistance of counsel.
One of the claims raised by Petitioner in his Amended Petition for relief is that:
"Trial Counsel permitted and allowed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement to contain
language which waived Defendant's right to appeal the Judgment and
Commitment Retained jurisdiction entered on December 20, 2011; or appeal from
the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction entered June 15,2012; or from filing a Rule
35 Motion for a modification of the sentence or even pursuing a post conviction
relief proceeding.
Trial counsel failed to ensure language was contained in the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement that in the event the Review Committee recommended probation that
the court would place the Defendant on probation." (Clerks Record, P. 52)
Petitioner asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because
counsel recommended and convinced him to accept the Rule 11 Plea Agreement even
though the Agreement required him to waive his right to appeal, file a Rule 35 Motion or
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pursue a post conviction relief proceeding because the recommendation contains an
inherent conflict of interest rendering the entry of a guilty plea involuntary and
unknowledgeab Ie.
1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be pursued under the Uniform

Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 224 P.3d 515 (Ct. App.
2009) On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, the appellate applies the same
standard utilized by the trial court to determine if there existed admissible evidence raised
by the petitioner which would entitle the petitioner relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho
671, 227P.3d 925 (2010); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 190 P.3d 920 (Ct. App. 2008)
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner must show that
counsel's performance was deficient but that he was prejudiced by the performance. To
establish deficiency the petitioner must show that counsels performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and to establish prejudice petitioner must show a
reasonable probability that, but for, the deficiency the outcome would have been
different. An appellate court will not second guess counsel's strategy or tactics unless
those decisions are based upon ignorance of the law, lack of preparation or other
objective deficiency. Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448; Aragon v, State, 114 Idaho 758,
760 P.3d 1174 (1988); Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 880 P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1994)
On the other hand if the petition, affidavits and other information allege facts that
if true entitle the petitioner to relief, then the petition may not be summarily dismissed.
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,102 P.3d 1108 (2008) Bergv. State, 131 Idaho 517,
960 P.2d 738 (1998)
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2.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST CLAIM

Petitioner contends that his attorney, in convincing him to accept the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement and the waiver, particularly of his 19-4901 rights which would include a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, had an inherent conflict of interest which
rendered the plea of guilty involuntary, unknowledgeable, and unintelligently made, and
therefore defective.
The relevant part of Rule 11, IeR, provides that:

Plea Agreement Procedure.
(1) In general. The prosecuting attorney and the attorney for the
defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a
view toward reaching an agreement, which may include a waiver of the
defendant's right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the court, that upon
entering a plea of guilty to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the
prosecuting attorney will do any of the following:
(A)
move for a dismissal of other charges; or
(B)
make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's
request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such
recommendation or request shall not be binding on the court; or
(C)
agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the
case; or
(D)
agree to any other disposition of the case.
(f)

The Court may participate in any such discussions.

Rule H(!)
The rule specifically allows for a waiver of the defendant's right to appeal a
judgment and sentence, but the rule makes no mention of a waiver of 19-4901 rights.
The waiver of an appeal set forth in the rule makes sense because the defendant knows
exactly what he can expect from a disposition of the case after a plea of guilty because
the provisions related to the disposition and sentence are binding on the judge and the
defendant knows that at the time of the judgment or sentence precisely what the sentence
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will be otherwise the rule allows the defendant to withdraw his plea and the matter can
then be set for trial. But here jurisdiction was retained and the final disposition was not
known until the review hearing was conducted. The Rule 11 Plea Agreement failed to
the extent that there were a number of unknowns to be contended with.
Prosecutors typically require a waiver of not only the judgment and sentence but
Rule 35 and 19-4901 rights as well. By making such a requirement a part of the plea
agreement the prosecutor has

exceeded the authority granted by the rule. By doing so

the prosecutor likewise has created a conflict of interest in that the waiver eliminates any
post relief allegation of prosecutorial misconduct which might have not been known at
the time the agreement was made. The defendant would by the waiver be precluded
from raising that claim or any other claim on a post conviction relief proceeding.
In addition Rule 1.8(h)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct states that
"A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a
client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the
agreement." When the waiver requires the defendant to waive his right of appeal and all
post-conviction rights then arguably Rule 1.8(h)(1) comes into play.
Here the trial judge found a waiver of the right to appeal, although jurisdiction
was retained. In dismissing the petition for post conviction the trial court began counting
the one year limitation period from the date sentence was pronounced because of the
waiver of a right to appeal, rather than from the jurisdictional review hearing when
jurisdiction was dropped and the sentence imposed. The effect of the conflict of interest
did not occur until jurisdiction was dropped.
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In accord with the provisions of our Rule 11 is the case of Rae v. State, 03COl9901-CC-00029, 2000WL, 30071 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 18, 2000) which held as
follows: "Although a criminal defendant may waive the right to a direct appeal as part of
a plea agreement, we conclude today that a defendant may not waive his or her right to
post-conviction remedies as part of a plea agreement." The rational of the holding was
that post-conviction relief proceedings are significantly different from a direct appeal and
could address other constitutional issues.
On August 12-13,2013, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
adopted Resolution 113E. That resolution provides:

RESOLVED, THAT the American Bar Association opposes plea or sentencing
agreements that waive a criminal defendant's post-conviction claims addressing
ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct or destruction of
evidence unless based upon past instances of such conduct that are specifically
identified in the plea or sentencing agreement or transcript of the proceedings; and
FURTHER RES LOVED THAT a defendant must be provided independent
counsel before being permitted to waive those post-conviction claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel that are specifically identified in the plea or
sentencing agreement or transcript of the proceedings.
FURTHER RESOLVED, THAT the American Bar Association urges judges in
all jurisdictions to reject plea and sentencing agreements that include waivers of a
criminal post conviction claims addressing ineffective assistance of counsel,
prosecutorial misconduct, or destruction of evidence unless based upon past
instances of such conduct that are specifically identified in the plea or sentencing
agreement or transcript ofthe proceedings.
In Burgess v. State, 342 S.W.3d 325 (Miss. 2011) the Missouri Supreme Court
was confronted with a post conviction relief proceeding. The defendant had entered into
a plea agreement which provided that he waive his post conviction rights by entering plea
of guilty to the charge of discharging a firearm at a building. He received a fifteen year
sentence which was suspended and was placed on probation. He subsequently violated
APPELLATE BRIEF - 8

his probation by discharging a firearm, his probation was revoked and the fifteen year
sentence invoked.

The defendant filed a petition for post conviction relief alleging

among other things ineffective assistance of counsel because of the advice to waive his
post conviction rights. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition without making
any findings. The defendant appealed the decision of the trial court. While the issue of
the waiver was an issue before the supreme court, the supreme court set aside the order
revoking probation, and directed the trial court to conduct a hearing and make findings of
fact. Since the appeal was decided on a matter other than the waiver, the waiver was not
addressed. However, a concurring jurist filing a separate opinion stated the following:

I concur in the principal opinion but write separately to point out that the findings
of fact and conclusions of law to be made in the circuit court on remand should
inc1 ude findings as to whether defense counsel or the prosecutor went beyond the
limits set forth in Formal Opinion 126 of the Advisory Committee of this Court.
Specifically, the factual record should address these questions:
1)

Whether defense counsel advised his client, Clarence Burgess, to waive
the client's right to seek post conviction relief based upon ineffective
assistance of defense counsel; and

2)

Whether the prosecuting attorney required that Burgess waive all rights
under rule 24.035 (The post conviction proceeding rule) when entering
into this plea agreement.

Formal Opinion 126, interpreting Rules 4-1.7, 4-3.8 and 4-8.4 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, reads as follows:

WAIVER OF POST -CONVICTION RELIEF

We have been asked whether it is permissible for defense counsel in a criminal
case to advise the defendant regarding waiver of a right to seek post-conviction
relief under Rule 24.035 including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
We understand that some prosecuting attorneys have expressed intent to require
such a waiver as part of a plea agreement.
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It is not permissible for defense counsel to advise the defendant regarding
waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by defense counsel.
Providing such advice would violate Rule 4-1.7(a)(2) because there is a
significant risk that the representation of the client would be materially
limited by the personal interest of defense counsel. Defense counsel is not
a party to the post-conviction relief proceeding but defense counsel
certainly has a personal interest related to the potential for a claim that
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance to the defendant. It is not
reasonable to believe that defense counsel will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to the defendant regarding
effectiveness of defenses counsel's representation of the defendant.
Therefore, under Rule 4-1. 7(b)(1), this conflict is not waivable.

We have also been asked whether it is permissible for a prosecuting
attorney to require waiver of all rights under Rule 24.035 when entering
into a plea agreement. We believe it is inconsistent with the prosecutor's
duties as a minister of justice and the duty to refrain from conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice for a prosecutor to seek a
waiver of post-conviction rights based on ineffective assistance of counsel
or prosecutorial misconduct. See, Rules 4-3.8 and 8A(d). We note that at
least three other states have issued opinions consistent with our view.
342 S.W.2d at 329.

United States v. Kentucky Bar Association, 2013-SC-270 is a case pending in the
Supreme Court of Kentucky. The United States Attorneys for the Eastern and Western
Districts of Kentucky brought suit against the Kentucky Bar Association because the
Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Opinion E-435 conflicts with federal law. Advisory
Ethics Opinion KBA E-435, November 17,2012 provides as follows:

SUBJECT:

Plea Agreements Waiving the Right to Pursue an Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claim.

Question 1:

Maya criminal defense lawyer advise with regard to a plea agreement that
waives the client's right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel as part of the waiver of the right to collaterally attack a conviction
covered by the plea agreement?
NO.

ANSWER:
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Question 2: Maya prosecutor propose a plea agreement that requires a waiver of the
defendant's or potential defendant's right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel relating to the matter that is the subject ofthe plea agreement?
ANSWER: NO.
A copy of the full text ofKY. B. ASS'N., Advisory Ethics Op. E-435, 77 Bench &
Bar 2 (March 2013) is attached to this brief as Addendum A.

The opinion has this concluding statement:
It is the opinion of the NACDL Ethics Advisory Committee that, aside from
whether courts might give such waivers, the rules of professional ethics prohibit a
criminal defense lawyer from signing a plea agreement limiting the client's
liability to claim ineffective assistance of counsel. The lawyer has a conflict of
interest in agreeing in agreeing to such a provision because it becomes a
prospective limiting of liability. Therefore, the lawyer is duty bound to object to
portions of a plea agreement that limit 2255 claims and refuse assent to such an
agreement with such language in it. (Brief of Amicus Curie, p. 4-5)
It should be noted that a 2255 claim is the Federal provision for post-conviction relief.

(A copy of the Amicus Brief is attached hereto as Addendum B.)
In Majors v. State, 568 N.E. 2d 1065 (1991) the Indiana Appeals Court held
concerning a case in which the plea agreement contained a provision waiving the
defendant's post-conviction rights: "... we do hold that such provisions in plea agreements
which waive the right to seek post-conviction relief are void and unenforceable." Id. at
1067.
The authorities cited above provide authority for the proposition that a plea
agreement which waives the ability of a defendant to assert an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is inherently a significant conflict of interest and a plea of guilty to a
charge containing such a provision cannot stand.
The Trial Court in the present case in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss dated May 4,
2013 gave notice to the waiver of right to file post-conviction relief even citing the
APPELLATE BRIEF - 11

NACDL Ethics Advisory Committee Formal Opinion 12-02, October 27, 2012. The trial
Court, however declined to "find the waiver of the right to pursue post-conviction relief
was a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver." I believe the Trial Court should have
conducted a hearing to make the determination if the waiver was knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily made. Any plea is by its very nature is coercive and is a contract of
adhesion. That is the prosecutor dictates the terms of the agreement and in this case
improperly inserted the waiver of post-conviction rights although reserving the right to
recommend imposition of sentence at the review hearing assuming a favorable
recommendation for the defendant by the Review Committee. I believe the Trial Court
should have addressed the issue of the conflict of interest.
The Trial Court did deny relief to Green on the limited basis of timeliness of the
filing of the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

The Court stated that Green's one year

statute of limitations to file such Petition began to run On December 20, 2011 and
expired December 2012. The Court did not take into account the time Green spent on the
retained jurisdiction. However, as a basis for not tolling the one year period while Green
was on his rider, was the Court's statement that "Petitioner waived his right to file an
appeal, therefore, the period of retained jurisdiction did not act to toll the time for filing
the post-conviction petition." (Clerk's Record, P. 83) But whether the time limit was
tolled or not goes to the heart of Petitioner's contention herein of the inherent conflict of
counsel in agreeing to the waiver of Petitioner's right to appeal, file a Rule 35 motion, or
post-conviction rights. The conflict occurred when the agreement was signed resulting in
a failure of Petitioner to enter a voluntary, knowing and intelligent plea of guilty.
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The

conflict of interest was ab initio from the signing of the Plea Agreement and could not be
an effective waiver of his appeal rights.
3.

TIMELINESS OF THE FILING OF THE POST-CONVICTION PETITION.
The Trial Court essentially determined that the one year limitation period for the

filing of a post-conviction proceeding commenced at the time judgment and sentence was
entered on December 20, 2011 plus 42 days. However, the defendant served a rider and
the Court refused to toll the one year statute during that period of time. The real and
effective entry of judgment and sentence occurred when the Court dropped the retained
jurisdiction and imposed sentence. That occurred on June 15,2012. Idaho Code 19-4902
(a) establishes the time frame in which an application for post-conviction relief may be
filed:

" ... An application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, which ever is later."

In this case the ineffective assistance of counsel claim arose when counsel advised or
permitted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement to contain the language waiving Green's right to
appeal, file a Rule 35 motion or post-conviction relief proceedings. The Court followed
the plea agreement by imposing a sentence but retaining jurisdiction.

Retaining

jurisdiction was key. When was the operative time to file a Rule 35 Motion? Rule 35,
IeR, provides: "The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the filing of a

judgment of conviction or 120 days after the court release retained jurisdiction.... Motions
to correct or modify sentences under this rule must be filed within 120 days of the entry
of the judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction and shall be
considered and determined by the court without the admission of additional evidence and
APPELLATE BRIEF - 13

without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion; provided
however, that no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a reduction of
sentence under this Rule."
Although Rule 11 permits entry to a plea of guilty which may allow a waiver of a
defendant's right to appeal a judgment and sentence, no mention is made of the effect of
a Rule 35 motion not a 19-4901 claim. A right to appeal from a judgment and sentence
would have to occur within forty-two days of the entry of the judgment. If the court
retains jurisdiction the forty-two day appeal limitation would expire before the retained
jurisdiction was determined. Because a defendant is only entitled to one Rule 35 motion,
and Rule 35 specifically allows a defendant to file a motion to correct or modify a
sentence within 120 days of release of the retained jurisdiction, reasonableness and
common sense dictate that a defendant would not file such motion until after
determination of the retained jurisdiction. If retained jurisdiction is released by the court,
the right to file a Rule 35 motion is critical. In any event the final determination occurred
when the court dropped jurisdiction. That should have been the time from which the
filing of post conviction proceedings should be measured.
The usual circumstance where the court retains jurisdiction, and a defendant
receives a favorable recommendation for probation, the court will place the defendant on
probation.

It is the extraordinary case where the court receives a favorable

recommendation of probation and the court does not follow that recommendation. I do
not have a statistical percentage available to me but my estimate would be that the courts
follow the recommendation of the review committee if probation is recommended in the
high ninety percentile. It is the experience of this attorney of having only one judge
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release jurisdiction after a favorable recommendation for probation. And that occurred
one time in approximately 250 cases involving retained jurisdiction handled by this
counsel.
But two things occurred here.

Counsel for Green negotiated a sentence to

include a provision for retained jurisdiction.

Counsel assumed that if there was a

favorable probation recommendation, the client would be placed on probation. But the
Plea Agreement also contained a waiver of Rule 35 and post-conviction rights. Again
Counsel assumed if there was a favorable probation recommendation from the review
committee the client would be placed on probation. But the prosecuting attorney reserved
the right to argue for imposition of sentence rather than probation even if the review
committee recommended probation. That is a position which constitutes a conflict of
interest on the part of the prosecutor. But counsel for Green prospectively could not
foresee that the court would release jurisdiction in spite of a favorable probation
recommendation.

But counsel did permit the right of the prosecutor to argue for

imposition of sentence in spite of such recommendation And counsel did not protect his
client from such a contingency by waiving his Rule 35 or post-conviction rights. By
advising or permitting his client to waive both Rule 35 and post-conviction rights, an
inherent conflict of interest occurred with counsel's representation of Green. Refer to the
discussion above on conflict of interest.
Since a Rule 35 motion would not be used until the outcome of the retained
jurisdiction was determined, the limitation time from which to file a Rule 35 motion was
tolled until after completion of the rider. That would have been 120 days from June 8,
2012. The right to file a post-conviction proceeding would have began to run at the time
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of the determination of the Rule 35 motion. The March 13, 2013 filing date of the
Petitioner in this case was well within the one year period for the filing of a postconviction relief proceeding using this reasoning.
But even if the Rule 35 motion is not available to the defendant, the Petition for
Post-Conviction relief was still filed within one year from the determination of the
retained jurisdiction proceeding.
The case law indicates that the time limitation to file an appeal is enlarged by the
length of time the district court retains jurisdiction, however when the court releases
jurisdiction in that instance the time limitation period begins to run from that date. State
v. Joyner, 121 Idaho 376, (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Tucker, 103 Idaho 885,655 P.2d 92
(Ct. App. 1982)
The Court relinquished jurisdiction on June 15, 2012. Green, through counsel,
filed within forty-two days a direct appeal from that determination.

The Supreme Court

dismissed the appeal on August 23, 2012. The Remittitur was filed on September 13,
2012. Counsel also filed a Rule 35 Motion which was dismissed on August 17,2012.
Petitioner, Green, asserts based upon the inherent conflict of interest of counsel in
permitting the Plea Agreement to contain the waivers of his right to appeal, file a rule 35
motion and post-conviction relief proceedings this Court should find on an equitable
basis and such conflict of itnerest that the Petition for Post-Conviction relief was timely
and grant to Petitioner a right to be heard.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner Green was denied effective assistance of counsel due to counsel's
inherent conflict of interest in permitting and allowing Petitioner to enter into a Rule 11
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Plea Agreement in which Petitioner waived his right to post judgment rights to appeal,
file Rule 35 motion and post-conviction relief proceedings.

The conflict of interest

interfered with Petitioner's ability to make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea of
guilty per the Plea Agreement.
The remedy this court should provide is to remand this matter back to the trial
court to conduct a hearing for the express purpose of determining the validity of the plea
taking into consideration the conflict of interest.
Dated this

day of December, 2013.

Richard L. Harris
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

ETHICS OPINION KBA E-435
November 17, 2012
Subject:
Question I:

Answer:
Question 2:
Answer:
References:

Plea Agreements Waiving the Right to Pursue an InetTective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Maya criminal defense la""yer advise a client with regard to a plea agreement that waives the elient's right to pursue a elaim of ineffective assistance of counsel as part of the waiver of the right to collaterally attack a conviction
covered by the plea agreement?
No.
Maya prosecutor propose a plea agreement that requires a waiver of the defendant's or potential defendant's right
to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the matter that is the subject of the plea agreement'?
No.
SCR 3.130 [Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct] (\.7, 1.8(h)(I), 3.8(b), 3.8 Cmt I, 8.4(a»; Va. State Bar
Legal Eth. Op. 1857 (2011); Mo. S. Ct. Adv. Comm. FOImal Op. 126 (2009); Ohio Adv. Op. 2001-6 (2001); Vt.
Adv. Eth. Op. 95-04 (1995); N.C. Eth. Op. RPC 129 (1993). Tex. Eth. Op. 571 (2006) Az. Eth. Op. 95-08 (1995)

Question I Discussion
Defense Coul/sel May Not Advise a Client about a Plea Agreement Involving a Waiver of the Right to Pursue an Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claim Related to the Subject of the Plea Agreement
Prosecutors sometimes propose plea agreements that bar collateral attacks on convictions that result from the plea agreements.
Sometimes these plea agreement proposals require the defendant to waive the right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The question that has arisen is whether defense counsel may ethically advise the client about a plea agreement proposal that
bars the client from later pursuing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the conviction that results from the plea
agreement. In effect, the question is whether defense cOlllsel may advise the client regarding a waiver of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that would bc based on the attorncy's own conduct in representing the clicnt. Because the offered plea agreement
creates a conflict of interest under SCR 3.130( 1.7) for the attorney that cannot be waived, such an attorney ethically cannot advise a
client about such an agreement.
SCR 3.l30( \.7(a» states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a conCUlTent conflict
of interest. A conCUlTent conflict of interest exists if: ...
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the la""yer.
The lawyer in the plea agreement setting has a "personal interest" that creates a "significant risk" that the representation of the
client "will be materially limited." The lawyer has a clear interest in not having his or her representation of the client challenged on
the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The lawyer certainly has a personal interest in not having his or her representation of
the client found to be constitutionally ineffective.
Even in cases of concurrent conflict, SCR 3.130( 1.7) allows a representation to occur if, among other requirements, "the lawyer
reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client."
SCR(l.7(b)(l). A lawyer cannot reasonably believe that he or she can provide competent representation when the lawyer is tasked
with advising the client about a plea agreement involving a waiver of the right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
when that claim would be based on the attorney's own conduct in representing the client.
This reasoning is consistent with the reasoning surrounding SCR 3.130(1.8(h)(1)). Rule 1.8(h)(I) states: "A lawyer shall not: (I)
make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement." Thus, a lawyer cannot ethically advise the client when the issue is the attorney's own conduct.
Rule 1.8(h)( I) does not directly apply to the plea agreement situation because the issue in the plea agreement situation is a waiver
of the client's ineffective assistance claim, not a waiver or limitation of a malpractice claim. Yet, the underlying basis for a malpractice claim is the attorney's own professional conduct. Likewise, the underlying basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
the attomey's own professional conduct. If a lav;'Yer ethically cannot advise a client about a malpractice limitation, a lawyer ethically
cannot advise a client about an ineffective assistance of counsel waiver.
Other ethics bodies have reached the conclusion that defense counsel may not advise the client on a plea agreement when the
agreement involves a waiver of the right to later claim ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Va. State Bar Legal Eth. Op. 1857
(2011); Mo. S. Ct. Adv. Cornm. Fornlal Op. 126 (2009); Ohio Adv. Op. 2001-6 (2001); Vt. Adv. Eth. Op. 95-04 (1995); N.C. Eth.
Op. RPC 129 (1993). But see Tex. Eth. Op. 571 (2006) (conflict of interest must be evaluated on a case by case basis); Az. Eth. Op.
95-08 (l995)(Rule 1.8 not a bar to defense counsel's participation; no discussion of the conflict of interest).
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Question 2 Discussion
A Prosecutor May Not Propose a Plea Agreement Requiring a Waiver of the Right to Pursue anlneilective Assistance ofCoul1sel
Claim Relating to the Matter that is the Subject of the Plea Agreement
A prosecutor cannot ethically offer a plea agreement to a defendant or potential defendant that requires that the person waive his
or her right to pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim relating to the representation in the matter that involves the plea
agreement. Accord Va. State Bar Legal Eth. Op. 1857 (2011); Mo. S. Ct. Adv. Comm. Formal Op. 126 (2009); Ohio Adv. Op. 2001-6
(2001); N.C. Eth. Op. RPC 129 (1993).
As Comment I to SCR 3.130(3.8) states:
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence.
SCR 3.130(3.8) Cmt 1. SCR 3.130(3.8(b)) requires a prosecutor to "make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been
advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel." In
addition, SCR 3. 130(8.4(a)) states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules ofProtessional Conduct, knowingly assist Of induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another.
SCR 3. 130(8.4(a)).
It is inconsistent with the prosecutor's role as a minister of justice and the spirit of SCR(3.8(b» for a prosecutor to propose a plea
agreement that requires the individual to waive his or her right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accord Mo. S.
Ct. Adv. Comm. Formal Op. 126 (2009).
In making such a proposal, a prosecutor is assisting or inducing another lawyer, defense counsel, to violate the Rules of Proiessional Conduct, conduct proscribed by Rule 8.4(a). Accord Va. State Bar Legal Eth. Op. 1857 (20 11).
Note to Reader
This ethics opinion has been fonnally adopted by the Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar Association under the provisions of Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.530. Note that the Rule provides: "Both informal and formal opinions shall be advisory only; however,
no attorney shal1 be disciplined for any professional act perfonned by that attorney in compliance with an infornlal opinion furnished
by the Ethics Committee member pursuant to such attorney"s written request, provided that the written request clearly, fairly, accurately
and completely states such attorney's contemplated professional act."
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ADDENDUMB

PURPOSE OF AMICUS BRIEF
The purpose of this amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL"), Law Professors and Legal Ethics Practitioners in Support of the Respondent is to provide this Court with the experience and ex perrise on this issue that tbe amici have acquired over the years.

STATElvIENT CONCERi~ING A~fICUS PARTICIPATION
IN ORAL ARGUMENT
NACDL, as amicus curiae. respectfully requests leave to participate in oral argumcnt a(ld be allowed to divide time with the respondent, the Kentucky Bar Association.
NACDL's participation in oral argument would benefit this Court because NACDL has
been involved with both of the ethical issues contained in Kentucky Advisory Ethics Op.
E-435 for more than ten years. addressing these issues in the context of criminal defense
attorneys and prosecutors practicing in both federal and state courts. If allowed to participate, NACDL's experience and expertise with regard to these ethical issues would be
available to answer this Court's questions and concerns.

INTEREST OF THE NACDL AS AMICUS
NACDL's interest in this matter is substantial and important. NACDL, organized
111

1958, is the preeminent bar association for criminal defense lawyers in the United

States, representing 9,500 direct members and 32,000 members through its 85 affiliate
organizations. NACDL's mission:
Ensurejustice and due process for persons accused of crime.
Foster the integrity, independence and expertise o'fthe criminal defense
profession.
Promote the proper and fair administration of criminal justice. I
I

htip:llw\vw.nacdLorgiaboutimission-and-values/.

NACDL has long maintained an Ethics Advisory Committee as a ready source of
timely intormation and guidance for NACDL members with ethics issues relating to their
representation of persons accused of crime, providing its membership with access to an
Ethics Hotline and by issuing written Ethics Opinions.
Criminal defense lawyers have ethical concerns not faced by other
lawyers, so the needs for advice and consultation of NACDL members are
unique.
. a. In confronting ethical issues, criminal defense lawyers have to
consider the implications of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance ofcounsel~ the governing state ethical rules, the law of criminal law
and crimina! procedure, and their personal moral code. Sometimes there
may appear to be conflicting duties between ethical rules or between ethical rules and our constitutional duties to the client. ,,,2
NACDL has long been involved in this issue. Upon recommendation of
NACDL's Ethics Advisory Committee, the NACDL Board of Directors ratified Ethics
Opinion No. 12-02 on October 27,2012 on Plea Agreements Barring Collateral Attack.J
That opinion foHows an original 2003 informal opinion4 and Board of Directors discusston in the same vein, renewed in 2012. and fonnalized the prior conclusion. The opinion
concludes:
It is the opinion of the NACDL Ethics Advisory Committee that. aside
from whether the courts might give such waivers, the rules of professional ethics
prohibit a criminal defense lawyer from signing a plea agreement limiting the client's ability to claim ineffective assistance of counseL The lawyer has a conflict
of interest in agreeing to such a provision because it becomes a prospective limit~
lUg of liability. Therefore. the lawyer is duty bound to object to portions of a plea
agreement that limit 2255 claims and refuse to assent to such an agreement with

MIssion Statement, Ethics Advisory Committee.
http://www.nacdLorgiethicsopinions/12-02/.
4 NACDVs 2003 informal opinion was cited wifuapprovalip .the Florida Proposed Advisory Opinion 12-1 (June 22.2012, voted late September 20l2).
2

3

u

d
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suchianguageinit. 5
The NACDL Opinion also believes that prosecutors have an ethical duty not to
limit inetfective assistance ciaims,6 The NACDL Opinion was issued two weeks before
the KentuckyBar's Advisory Ethics Op. E-435 (Nov. 12,2012).

This brief wiH assist the Court because: (1) NACDL has specific expertise in the

area representing the criminal defense bar; (2) NACDL's Ethics AdVISOry Committee has
dealt w1th this issue twice in ten years; and (3) legal scholars and ethicists stand in accord

with NACDL's position.

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS ETHICS LAW PROFESSORS AND
LEGAL ETHICS PRACTITIONERS
Amici are criminal justice and legal ethics scholars and legal ethics practitioners
throughout the United States ("Ethics Amici'''). Amid scholars have had extensive experience analyzing, studying, teaching and engaging in scholarship regarding the intersection of criminal law and procedure and legal ethics. Amici practitioners have had exten-

sive experience formulating. interpreting and applying the Rules of Professional Conduct
in various jurisdictions. They have served in leadership positions of numerous state and
local bar associations, committees, task forces and organizations dedicated to legal ethics
and the promuigation and enforcement of codes of professional conduct.
The case implicates the interests of Ethics Amici because it involves the standards
and rules for professional conduct and the fair administration ofjustice; Ethies Amici
submit this brief to underscore their support for the Kentucky Ethics Opinion and, to pro-

5
6

NACDL Ethics Advisory Op. 12-02 (Oct 27,2012) a.t 1.
fd at 6 (heading C).

iii

1
J

vide a national overview of the significant problems that arise by the inclusion of waivers
of ineffective assistance of counsel in both state and federal courts.

The foUowing are the Amici Scholars:

I

Professor Janet Ainsworth
Seattle University School of Law
Seattle, Washington

Professor Susan Klein
University of Texas Law School
Austin, Texas

Professor Gabriel J. Chin
University of California
Davis School of Law
Davis, California

Professor Carol Langford
University of San Francisco Law School
San Francisco, California
Professor Richard A. Loo
University of San Francisco
San Francisco; California

ProfeSsor Liz Ryan Cole
Vermont Law School
S. Royalton, Vermont

Professor Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer
Salmon P. Chase College of Law
Highlarid Heights, Kentucky

Associate Professor Tigran Eldred
New England School of Law
Boston, Massachusetts

Professor Milan Markovic
Texas Wesleyan University School
of LaFFort Worth, Te.xas

Professor Andrew Guthrie Ferguson
David A. Clarke School of Law
University of the District of Columbia
Washington, D.C.

Professor Kevin Mohr
Western State College of Law
Fullerton, California

Professor Lawrence Fox
Yale Law School

New Haven, Connecticut
Professor Ellen Podgor
Stetson University College of Law
Gulfport, Florida

Professor Monroe Freedman
Hofstra University School of Law
Hempstead, New York

Associate Professor Keith Swisher
Phoenix School of Law
Phoenix, Arizona

Professor Babe Howell
GUNY School of Law
Long Island City, New York

Professor Richard Zitrin
Hastings College oftne Law
San Francisco, California

Professor Peter Joy
Washington University School of Law
St Louis, Missouri

iv

The Legal Ethics Practitioners are:

Law Otnces of James Ellis Arden
North HoUyv/ood.. California

Arden Oison
Harrang Long Gary Rudnick P.C.
Eugene, Oregon

David M. Bigeleisen
San Francisco, California

Seth Rosner
Saratoga Springs. New York

J ames Bolan

Evan Shirley
Shirley and Associates
Honolulu, Hawaii

J ames Ellis Arden

Brecher, Wyner, Simons~ Fox
and Bolan. LLP
Boston, Massachusetts

Neal R. Sonnett
Neal R. Sonnett, P.A.
Miami, Florida

Darren R. Cantor
Darren R. Cantor, P.C.
Denver, Colorado

Brian Tannenbaum
Tannenbaum Weiss, P.L.
Miami, florida

David J. Chapman
D J Chapman Law, P.C.
Fargo, North Dakota

Donald Wilson,lr.
Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson
Phoenix, Arizona

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.
The Clinton Law Firm
Chicago, nlinois
Richard A. Greenberg
Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A.
Tallahassee, Florida
Harry H. Harkins, Jr.
Atlanta, Georgia
William Hodes
The William Hodes Law Firm
Indianapolis• .Indiana
John 1. Mueller
John 1. MueUer LLC
Cincinnati, OhiQ
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ARGUlVIENT
A.
Advisory Ethics Opinion E-435 does not conflict \'\<ith controlling federallaw. Federal statutes, regulations, and court rules recognize the lawyereonduct
ethics rules·ofthis state.
The U.S. Attorneys Offices (USAOs) argue that Kentucky Bar Association Ethics
Opinion E-435 conflicts with controlling federal law. USAOs Br. at 6-9. It does not. U.S.
Attorneys clearly must comply with the ethics rules of the states they practice in govern~
iug lawyer conduct.

1.

2& U.S.C. § 530B binds USAOs to statemwyercollductrules

The McDade Amendment, 28 U.S.C. §530B (adopted in 1998, P.L. 105,..277,
§101(b), effective April 1999) provides:
(a) An attorney for the Govemment shaH be subject to State laws
and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State
where such attorney engages in that attorney's duties. to the same extent
and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State.
, f (b) The Attorney General shall make and amend rules of the Department of Justice to assure compliance with this section.
Under (b). DOJ adopted regulations in support, and 28 C.F.R. § 77.3, not cited by
the USAOs, provides:

In all criminal investigations and prosecutions, in aU civil investigations and litigation (affirmative and defensive)~ and in all civil law enforcement investigations and proceedings, attorneys for the government
shall conform their conduct and activities to the state rules and laws, and
federal local court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such at·
torney engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in .the same
manner as other attorneys in that State, as these terms are defined in §77.2
of this part.
Even the Joint Local Ruies of the U.S. District Courts for the Eastemand Western
Districts of Kentucky adopt the professional (,.'Onduct rules of this Court in their local
rules LR 83.3(c) (civil cases) and LCrR 57.3(c) (criminal cases).

2.

Evidentiary and procedural rules v. attorney condud rules

Federal cases all make a distinction between ethics rules that become evidentiary
or procedural rules in federal court and those that instead regulate attorney conduct in the
courts. E435 is an attorney conduct opinion.
The USAOs cite several cases, e.g., Stern v. Us. District Court, D. Mass., 214
F.3d 4, 20 (1 st Cir. 2000), on the lack of power, in the guise of regulating ethics, to impose strictures that are inconsistent with federal law. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.1(b) (directing

that section 530B should not be construed in any way to alter federal substantive, procedural, or evidentiary law). The cases they cite, however, are limited to Complaints against
state ethics rules that become tantamount to rules of criminal procedure or evidentiary

rules. USAO Br. at 8. This is the law and cases not even cited by the USAOs and in ao-cord are: United States v. Lopez-Avila, 678 F3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2012) (§530B does
nor:~upport

a really strained double jeopardy argument under the Fifth Amendment);

United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (lith Cir. 1999) (Federal law, not state

law, determines the admissibility of evidence in federal court; the rule against offering
consideration to witnesses does not apply to witness immunity or leniency in exchange
for testimony); Ida v. United States. 207 F. Supp. 2d 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (attorney admission rules).
Amici also submit that USAO's reliance on Grievance Comm, for the S.D.N. Y. v.

Simels, 48 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 1995), is misplaced because it predates § 530B, so its holding now cannot be relied upon. (See the fonowing sub points infra at +-5,)
This Ethics Opinion regulates attorney conduct, is aimed directly at attorney conduct, and is hardly a rute of evidence or procedural law. Therefore, the USAOs must f01-

2

low it under § 530B.
3.

Conduct of an attorney
a.

Generally

It is within the power of the state to enforce state ethics rules. such as violations

of the "no contact" with represented persons. The sole issue that determines the proper
enforcement authority for rules directed at the conduct of lawyers is simple: is the attorney accountable for the alleged ethical violation or not? As.the Tenth Circuit explained in
United States v. Colorado Supreme Cottrt, 189 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999):

The focus of the courts disciplinary powers is on attorney behaVior
that is an affront to the express authority of the court, Of that shows an unfitness to discharge the attorney's continuingohHglltio.ns to the court o.r to
clients. Braley [v. Campbell], 832 F.2d [1504;} at 1510 n.S [(lOth Cir.
1987)(en bane)] (citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. [634,] at 645 ((1985». Accordingly. when a rule o.f professional conduct is viCiiated, members o.f the
pro.fession Wo.uld agree that the violating attorney o.ught to. be held personally acco.untable; whereas when a procedural o.r substantive rule is violated, any negative effect would be directed primarily at the progress of the
claim itself

See in re Telfair, 745 F. Supp. 2d 536, 567 n.28 (D.N.J. 2010) (considering various alleged ethical lapses of AUSAs and finding the complaints lacking); Matter o/Doe,
801 F.Supp. 478, 488 (D.N.M. 1992) (also, other courts, both federal and state, have consistently stated Government attorneys are not immune .from state bar disciplinary proceedings).
b~

DOJ violations of the no contact rule, (or example

For years, beginning with the Thornburgh Memorandum, the Department of Justice (DOJ) fo.ught to exempt federal prosecutors from state ethics rules, notably in seeking to circumvent the no contact rule that prevents lawyers from direct contact with defendants kno.wn to be represented by counseL (ABA Model Rules of Pro.fessio.nal Co.n-
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dUct 4.2; here Kentucky SCR 3.130(4.2». Essentially, former Attorney General Thornburgh determined that DOJ lawyers ,>vere not bound by state lawyers' ethics rules. In
1998. Congress stepped in and passed the McDade Amendment. 28 U.S.C. §530B, making plain that federal prosecutors are bound by state ethics rules. Before the passage of
that law, ethics complaints were sustained against a few DO] lawye.rs. See, e.g., Matter of

Howes, 1997 NMSC 024, i23 N.M. 311,940 P.2d 159 (1997) (federal prosecutor disctplined in licensing state for violating no contact rule in D.C at the direction of supervij

sor)• .Malter of Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.M. 1992) (federal prosecutor GOuld not remove state disciplinary action to federal court, and the argument it was procedural federal
law was rejected). I
Now, the U.S. Attorneys Manual § 9-13.200, Communications with Represented

Persons, recognizes the limits imposed by state ethics rules and keeps DOJ attorneys
from violating the no contact rule, and this is also the only place in the U.S. Attorneys
Manual that mentions §530B. See United States v. Bmvman, 277 r.8upp.2d 1239 (N.D.
Ala. 2003). vacated as moot by guilty plea, 2003 U.S. DisL LEXIS 24817 (N:D. Ala.
(2003) (§ 530B(a) vitiated DOJ regulations (Thornburgh memorandum purportedly authonzing represented person contact notwithstanding 4.2); in re Amgen Inc., 2011 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 68960 *38-39 (E.D.N.Y. April 6, 2011), adopted 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

!

ld. at 486:

. Similarly, John Doe's argument that the DOl is vested with the au~
thority to interpret wnen and how the code 6fethics applies to an AUSA
fails. The idea of placing the discretion for a rule's interpretatIon and enforcement solely in the hands of those governed by it not only renders the
rule meaning1ess~ but the notion of such an idea coming from the coun~
try's highest law enforcement official displays an arrogant disregard for
and irresponsibly undermines ethics in the legal profession.
4

63043 (E.D.N.Y. June

to, 2011) (holding that the no contact rule of Rule 4.2 must be in~

terpreted under New York's version of the rule, noting that Simels is no longer good law).

c.

E-435 is a lawyer conduct rule

Kentucky Bar Ethics Opinion E-435 is purely a lawyer conduct rule: It deals with
conflicts of interest in plea bargaining which resolves 97% of the cases handled by the
USAOs. What is remotely procedural federal law about a criminal defense lawyer having
a conf11ct of interestin negotiating a guilty plea for his or her client?
Criminal defense lawyers) deal with sensitive problems at the tiIne of counselmg a
client about a guilty piea offer that arise frornan oppressive pieaagree:ment provision-the waiver of a statutory right that potentially benefits the lawyer but harms the client.
They are not

"agreements'~

as ciassically understood because they are effectively adhe-

sion contracts that require the client to agree; otherwise he can "choose" go to trial and be
penalized by the trial tax of losing, at the very least, the benefit of «acceptance of responsibility" under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3EU, which provides for a reduction in
sentence by 2 or 3 points off the Guideline range for the offense.
To be sure. the government benefits from a waiver ofthe ability to later claim

in~

effective assistance of counsel, but what about the defendant and defense counsel? The
problem is that the person who would be one logical target of a post-conviction claim,
defense counsel, is advising the client whether or not to take the plea agreement. What if
tbeJawyer truly was ineffective at some point prior to the plea and knows it? That lawyer
clearly has a conflict of interest in advising the client to waive theclann: Nowhere else in
the law can a lawyer even presume to get away with such a limit on personal liability_
Yet, the USAOs insist upon it in criminal cases in Kentucky and a
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few other jurisdictions

(see infra, p. to). The practical effect ofthe USAO's position would be that attorneys who
fail to competently represent their clients will be able to more easily escape detection and
shield themselves from potential bar discipline. Such attorneys represent a threat to the
public atld the integrity of the justice system.

B.
Opinion E435 correctly concludes that waiver of ineffective assistance claims at a guilty plea creates a conflict of interest for the defense lawyer that
the prosecutor cannot impose on a pleading defendant.
1.
Plea bargaining Lr; the criminal justice system; 97% plead guilty in
federal courts nationwide.

I

The U.S. Supreme Court directly acknowledged the nature of our criminal justice
system: It is not one of trials, but of plea bargains.

Ninety~seven

peroent of federal con-

victions and ninety-five percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas. Mis-

souri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct 1399, 1407 (2012).2 The reality is that plea bargains have become
80

central to the administration of the criminai justice system that plea bargains are not an

adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system. Ed. (emphasis in
original) (quoting Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, lOt YALE L. J. 1909,

19t2 (1992».
This is the necessary context to understand why the U.S. Attorneys' requirement
of a waiver of aU ineffective assistance of counsel claims (a blanket waiver) in a pIca
agreement creates an inherent conflict for the criminal defense lawyer fulfilling the constitutionaUy mandated role of representing his or her client. In these waiver agreements,
there is no distinction made for waivers of past or future conduct and there is. no indica-

Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Bargain Process, 51 DUQUESNE L REV.
559,582085 (2013) (97,4% of federal and 95% of state defendants plead guilty); J. Vincent Aprile II, Waiving the Integrity of the Criminal Justice System, 24 CRIM. JUST. 46
(Winter 2010).
6
2.

tion of specifically identified allegations that are subject to the waiver. 3 Therefore, every~
thing is subject to these waivers. Thus, a defendant is required to waive a challenge to
prospective conduct that he or she cannot yet !mo,.\-,. And, the lawyer may be counseling a
waiver of a BradyiKyles violation or an actual innocence claim that will not be discov~
4

ered for months or years. Moreover, recent studies demonstr&te that most lawyers have an
unconscious bias that causes them to act out of self-interest when potential conflicts of
interest are present. Documented psychological biases impair their objectivity. 5

At its logical conclusion, then, it is. virtually impossible fur the client to provide

the lawyer with informed consent of a conflict waiver in this circumstance without bringing in another lawyer to assist in evaluating the waiver; the, the second lawyer would
have to get up to speed and learn the entire case. SCR 3.130(1.7) on conflict of interest
with current clients requires that a waiver be "vUh "informed consent." SCR 3 .130( 1.0)(e)
defines informed consent as. the agreement by a person to

11

proposed course of conduct

after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the mate~
rial risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.
Unfortunately, there are number of cases where defendants may enter a guilty
plea because the criminal defense lawyer has convinced the client to accept the plea offer
even though that lawyer has not performed minimal investigation or othen-vise provided a
competent and diligent defense. In other instances, the criminal lawyer cOlivinces a defendant to accept

it

guilty plea and the lawyer then engages in ineffective assistance at

J. Vincent Aprile II, Plea Waivers that Shield Defonse Coimsel andPrQsecu;.
tors, CRL\l. JUST. 46 (Summer 2013).
3

4

5

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest, 58 KAN. L. REV. 43

(2009).
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sentencing. Defendants. including those who did not commit the crime, have pleaded
guilty under such circumstances. It is not possible to know the number of innocent people
who have plead guilty to crimes to avoid lengthy prison tenns, but studies in recent years
have proven that the phenomenon occurs with greater frequency than once imagined,6
Currently

~heincentives

tor defendants to plead guilty are greater than at any previous

point in the history of our criminal justice system[,]" and "[t]oday, the incentives to bar~
gain are powerful enough to force even an innocent defendant to falsely confess guilt in

hopes of leniency and in fear ofreprisal,»7

2.

Collateral review by 2255 proceedings

In federal courts., it is only through a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

that an aggrieved defendant may litigate the ineffective assistance of his counseLs A 2255
motion in federal courts is far different from an appeal and quite limited in its focus. Wall
v. Kholi, 131

S. CL 1278, 1282 (2011) (coHateral review is judicial review of a judgment

in a proceeding that is not part of the direct appeal). Following a guilty plea in federal
court, the scope of the issues that may he raised on appeal is limited to issues left in a
conditional plea. F.R-erim.P. I 1(a)(2). Jurisdictional issues such 8..'\ a defect in the indict~
6 See Daniel Givelber. Meaningless AcqUittals. Meaningful Convictions: Do We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 13 17, 1343 (1997)(numbersofinnocence cases do notteliably include innocent people who plead guilty prior to trial); See
ABA Resolution 107 Adopted by the House of Delegates (August 2005) at
http://www.americanbar.orglcontentidamlabafmigratedilegalsetVicesidownloadslsclaid/in
digentdefensel2011 0325aba res 107,authcheckdam.pdf.
1 LucianE. D~an,-Bargained Justice: Plea Bargaining's Innocence Prt;Jbkm
and the Brady Safoty-Valve, 2012 UTAHL. REv. 51,64,56 (2012) (citing research literature to state "it is clear til at plea-bargaining has an innocence problem/~ ld:at84 &
n.251).
8 Defendants convicted in the state comts of Kentucky usually raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in guilty plea convictions pursuant to KentuckyRwe of
Criminal Procedure (Ref) 11.42, See Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 962 S. W.2d 870, 872
(Ky. 1998).
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ment, challenges to the plea procedure itself, and challenges to the sentence as provided
for by statute, may be considered on appeaL 18 U.S.c. § 3742. The only issues that can
be raised on appeal are those that appear on the face of the record.
Federal collateral attacks, on the other hand, proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
They are almost always, and usually must be, filed after the appeal is completed, and
cannot be used to litigate issues that were, or could have been, raised on appeal. United

Slates v. Brady, 456 U.S. 152, 165(982); These §2255 proceedings enable the defendant
to supplement the. recOrd with evidence that supports the claim that is not yet in the trial
or appeHate record. See, e.g, Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (1998).
The matters that can arise in a 2255 collateral attack are nearly infinite, but generally fall under categories of: def~nse counsel's ineffective assistance, jury misconduct,
witnesses who later concede that they had been lying, discovery of evidence backing actual innocence, including DNA evidence that exonerates the

defendan~

exculpatory evi-

dence that had not been disclosed by the prosecutors or police, or other claims ofljl.rosecutorial misconduct
Because challenges to defense counsel's effectiveness and prosecutorial

miscon~

duct are almost always discovered after conviction, they must be raised in a collateral attack. The effect of waivers of any collateral attack, however, is obvious; that defendants
may be unable to get judicial reHef from any such lawyer ineffectiveness or government
misconduct
Significantly, the type of broad. and problematic waivers found in the provisions
advanced by Kentucky's U.S. Attorneys deviate from those of most USAOs across the
country, Recently, the plea appeal and § 2255 waiver practices in all federal jurisdictions
9

were sampled by the Federal Defender in the Middle District of Florida in their Plea Appeal and Collateral Attack Waivers Chart to determine to what degree U.S. Attorneys
have used these waivers. The results show that they have neither taken root nor thrived.
and they appear in only 13% of the federaijurisdictions.
.. 18 jurisdictions (19%) have no appeal nor §2255 waivers whatsoever.
•

An additional 8 jurisdictions have waiver of appeal provisions. but no relin-

quishment of § 2255 rights. raising the numher of jurisdictions up to 26, or from 19% to
28%.
:1·.·
.. .'

.. Even in jurisdicti,ons that .retain express 2255 waivers in their plea agreements,

I

another 36 make exceptions for ineffective assistance of counselor prosecutorial misconductreview~

•

raising the ~umber up to 62, or'from 28% to 67%.

Finally, 3 more jurisdictions maintain appeal and 2255 waivers, but except

claims that the pleas were involuntary or invalid, both being positions that encompass
ineffective assistance or misconduct, raising the number to 65 districts, ovfrQm 67% to
70%.
Therefore, in 70% of all federal jurisdictions, the U.S. Attorney's Offices do not
bar defendants who enter into their standard plea agreements from pursuing ineffective
assistance or misconduct daims. Of the remaining 29 jurisdictions, most aHow for some
exceptions to a waiver of aU appeal and 2255 rights. A smail minority of 12 U.S. Attorneys Offices (or 13% ofthe total) retains language that waives all such rights without exception. Waivers at issue here are definitely not the norm nor are they deemednecessary
in most ferleral prosecution offices. 9

'i

The U.S. Attorneys' concern that the Ethics Opinion will create a huge burden
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3.
Defense counsel manifestly has a conflict of interest in acceding to a
plea agreement imposing a waiver of 2255 claims.
a.

Strickland dot's not apply

The USAO's brief starts from the premise that defense counsel is presumed effec·
tive. USAO Br. at

12-13~

Their brief ironically conflates the standard for ineffective as-

sistance of counsel inpost~conviction proceedings with a lawyer's conflict-free duty in
negotiating a plea and advising the client whether to take it. One is not the other.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,689 (1984), holds that a court must in-

I

dulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. That is the post-conviction standard, not the relevant one not
when defense counsel is considering whether a conflict of interest exists before conviction.
Moreover, the Strickland presumption of sound strategy has utterly no application
to defense counsel's pretrial detennination of whether a conflict of interest exists when
considering a plea agreement with a post-conviction waiver dause. Moreover, a !,'UiIty
plea is nota mere strategic choice. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187-88 (2004) (quotlng Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,240-42 (1969) (the plea is not simply a strategic
choice; it is itself a con:viction, id., at 242».

By comparison, the standard of review for conflicts of interest on direct appeal is

a. presumption ofprejudice when a pretrial objection is made. llo1101',,'aY Y. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 488-90 (1978).1t is,. however, actual prejudice jf it is raised for the first Hme in
a post-conviction proceeding. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.s. 335, 350 (1980); Mickens v.
on the prosecution and courts is belied by the 70% of the districts without these waivers;
their criminal justice systems have notcoHapsed due to their continued recognition of the
ethical and poticy issues raised by such waivers.
it

Taylor, 535 U.s. 162, 176 (2002).
Strategic decisions on conflicts are interest are presumed to favor the client over
the lawyer. Compare, e.g., F. R. Cnm. P. 44 on muItiplerepresentation conflicts.

b.
Defense counsel has a conflict of interest in counseling a client to
waive a 2255 claim forineffectlve assistance o(counsel.
i.

NACDLEthics Advisory Op. 12-02

Upon recommendation of NACDL's Ethics Advisory Committee, the NACDL
Board of'Directors ratified NACDL Ethics Advisory Gp. lZ..QZ on October 27, 2012, just
two weeks before the Kentucky Bar issued E-435.
The NACDL Ethics Advisory Committee believes that defense
counsel faced with a waiver of ineffective assistance claims in a proposed
plea agreement has a conflict of interest forced on defense counsel by the
government (Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1. 7(a)....
In such plea agreements. the lawyer is advising the client to waive
his or her rights to challenge the constitutional effectiveness of the lawyer.
This is an obvious contlict of loyalty to the client. Id., Comment 11 W.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-101(A) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERl'lING LA \VYERS § 125 (2000) are in accord. Conflicts of interest between lawyer and client have constitutional
implications.
NACDL Gp. lZ-02at 5. The opinion also concludes: (1) that the lawyer is limiting liability in violation of Rule L8(h){1) because an ineffective assistance claim must be
successful before a legal malpractice claim will lie; NACDL Op. 12-02 at 5-6; and (2)
prosecutors also cannot ethically offer such plea agreernentsand put defense counsel in
that position.ld. at 6.
ii.

The overwhelming majority of state opinions agree with E435

Nine other state ethics opinions are in accord. and the Kentucky Bar Association
cites them an: All of the state ethics authorities considering this issue are basically in ae12

cord: Alabama Informal Op. (Sept. 22, 2010); Missouri Op. 126 (May 19,2009); North
CaroHna Op. PRC 139 (Jan. 15, 1993); Ohio Op. 2001-6 (Dec. 7, 2001); Tennessee Op.
94~A549

(1995); Vermont Op. 95-04 (1995). Florida's Ethics Committee approved its

draft opinion, Proposed Advisory Opinion 12-1 (June 22, 2012, voted late September
20l2), citing NACDL's Proposed Opinion 03-02.
The two states with differing opinions. Texas and Arizona, do not necessarily
conclude that such waivers always pass muster. Even Texas Op. 571 (May 2006), cited
with approval by the USA Os, mentions that the waiver has to be knowin& which could
require that independent counsel is brought in to advise on the subject. to Arizona Op. 95-

I

08 (1995) for some reason does not even cite to the conflict of interest rule, relying solely
on Rule i.8(h). It also has a dissenting opinion.
-..,.-

..
The USAO's concern about balkanization of the ethics rules is answered by Con-

gress's adoption of §530B which intends to do just that.

iii.

Limitations on liability are also unethical under SCR 3. 130(1.8(h»

Most of the state ethics opinions on-this subject concluded that such a 2255 waiver amounts to an impermissible waiver of the lawyer's liability. This, we submit, also
violates SCR 3. 130(1.8(h».

It is clear in almost all states that a defendant must set aside his conviction before
he of she can sue for maipractice. NACDL Ethics Advisory Gp. 12-02 at 5-6 recognizes

I

this~
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Jd.:

'" provided that in the particular case the defense lawyer fufIy complies
with the applicable requirements of [the conflict rules] with respect to any
conflict of interest arising from the waiver of post-conviction appeals
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
13

An ineffective assistance c1aim is not strictly a malpractice claim,
but a successful ineffective assistance claim is a predicate to suing a criminal defense lawyer for malpractice in virtually all jurisdictions. RESTATEMENT § 53 t Comment d (colorable claim ofinnocence must be made before malpractice action wiJI lie against criminal defense lawyer); 3
RONALD E. MAllEN & JEFFERY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALP~<\CTICE § 27: 13
(2012 ed.) (nearly universal rule); compare Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994) (§ 1983 cannot be used to collaterally attack a conviction until
the conviction is set aside).
Kentucky is in accord. Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 225 (Ky. App. 1997); Stc-

phens v. Denison, 150 S.W3d 80, 83-84 (Ky. App. 20(4) (because Stephens "had not

I

obtained exoneration from his conviction and sentence through post·conviction relief, he
may not maintain a cause of action against [detense counsel] for legal malpractice.").
The USAOs argue that Rule 1.8(h), which prohibits lawyers from making an
agreement prospectively Hmiting the lawyers liability to a client for malpractice unless
the client is independently represented, is not analogous to the ethical issues addressed in
E-435. USAO Br. at 16. However, when analyzed in connection with Kentucky's legal
malpractice law, the waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel, wiiether contained in a
genera! or a specific waiver, do not simply limit the criminal defense attorney's liability
to the defendant for malpractice - indeed, they effectively immunize defense counsel
from a malpractice judgment.

TIlerefore, under the USAO's version a criminal defense lawyer could be completely ineffective, facilitate a \vTongfu] conviction, and remain completely immune from
ch'illiabiHtyt! because the federal prosecutors seek to deny the defendant any ability to
challenge his or her lawyer's effectiveness in the events leading up totbe.guilty plea;

This should be contrary to publicpoHcy.

!!

Or probably even disciplinary sanction without a record being made.
14

,
I

CONCLUSION
Kentucky Ethics Op. E-435 is a correct statement of the controlling ethical principIes and does not conflict with any law, The governing ofiawyer conduct is completely
within the power of the State, and federal prosecutors

are bound by the State's ethics

rules under 28 U,S,C. §530b. This ethics opinion governs the conduct of prosecutors and
criminal defense attorneys who practice in the state courts ofKentucky as well in the federal courts in Kentucky. Therefore, the U.S. Attorney's brief of United Slates in Support

of Motion for Review of Ethics Opinion should be rejected and the ethics opinion as written should be affrrmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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